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Abstract
Nonlinear Boolean functions play an important role in the design of block ciphers, stream
ciphers and one-way hash functions. Over the years researchers have identi5ed a number of
indicators that forecast nonlinear properties of these functions. Studying the relationships among
these indicators has been an area that has received extensive research. The focus of this paper
is on the interplay of three notable nonlinear indicators, namely nonlinearity, avalanche and
correlation immunity. We establish, for the 5rst time, an explicit and simple lower bound on
the nonlinearity Nf of a Boolean function f of n variables satisfying the avalanche criterion of
degree p, namely, Nf¿ 2n−1−2n−1−(1=2)p. We also identify all the functions whose nonlinearity
attains the lower bound. As a further contribution of this paper, we prove that except for very
few cases, the sum of the degree of avalanche and the order of correlation immunity of a Boolean
function of n variables is at most n− 2. The new results obtained in this work further highlight
the signi5cance of the fact that while avalanche property is in harmony with nonlinearity, both
go against correlation immunity. c© 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
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1. Introduction
Confusion and di;usion, introduced by Shannon [19], are two important princi-
ples used in the design of secret key cryptographic systems. These principles can be
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enforced by using some of the nonlinear properties of Boolean functions involved in
a cryptographic transformation. More speci5cally, a high nonlinearity generally has a
positive impact on confusion, whereas a high degree of avalanche enhances the e;ect
of di;usion. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that some nonlinear properties
contradict others. These motivate researchers to investigate into relationships among
various nonlinear properties of Boolean functions.
The resistance to various attacks such as linear, di;erential and correlation attacks
simultaneously depends on various cryptographic criteria of Boolean functions, includ-
ing nonlinearity, avalanche criterion and correlation immunity. This can be seen from
work by a number of researchers, including but not limited to [8,12,16,17].
One can consider three di;erent relationships among nonlinearity, avalanche and
correlation immunity, namely, nonlinearity and avalanche, nonlinearity and correlation
immunity, and avalanche and correlation immunity. Zhang and Zheng [24] studied how
avalanche property inFuences nonlinearity by establishing a number of upper and lower
bounds on nonlinearity. Carlet [4] showed that one may determine a number of di;erent
nonlinear properties of a Boolean function, if the function satis5es the avalanche crite-
rion of a high degree. Zheng and Zhang [29] proved that Boolean functions satisfying
the avalanche criterion in a hyper-space coincide with certain bent functions. They also
established close relationships among plateaued functions with a maximum order, bent
functions and the 5rst-order correlation immune functions [27,28]. Seberry, Zhang and
Zheng were the 5rst to research into relationships between nonlinearity and correlation
immunity [17]. Very recently Zheng and Zhang have succeeded in deriving a new tight
upper bound on the nonlinearity of high-order correlation immune functions [30,31].
In the same paper they have also shown that correlation immune functions whose
nonlinearity meets the tight upper bound coincide with plateaued functions introduced
in [27,28]. All these results help further understand how nonlinearity and correlation
immunity are at odds with each other.
The aim of this work is to widen our understanding of other connections among
nonlinearity properties of Boolean functions, with a speci5c focus on relationships
between nonlinearity and avalanche, and between avalanche and correlation immunity.
We prove that if a function f of n variables satis5es the avalanche criterion of degree
p, then its nonlinearity Nf must satisfy the condition of Nf¿2n−1 − 2n−1−(1=2)p. We
also identify the cases when the equality holds, and characterize those functions that
have the minimum nonlinearity. This result tells us that a high degree of avalanche
guarantees a high nonlinearity.
In the second part of this paper, we look into the question of how avalanche and
correlation immunity hold back each other. We prove that with very few exceptions,
the sum of the degree of avalanche property and the order of correlation immunity of
a Boolean function with n variables is less than or equal to n− 2. This result clearly
tells us that we cannot expect a function to achieve both a high degree of avalanche
and a high order of correlation immunity.
For the sake of completeness, we also summarize relationships between nonlinearity
and correlation immunity. In particular, we include our recent results [30] about upper
bound on nonlinearity of high-order correlation immune functions, which indicates how
correlation immunity contradicts nonlinearity.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic concept
of Boolean functions that used in this paper. Section 3 proposes a number of impor-
tant criteria for cryptographic Boolean functions. Section 4 and Section 5 investigate
relationships between nonlinearity and avalanche, and relationships between avalanche
and correlation immunity, respectively. Section 6 surveys relationships between nonlin-
earity and correlation immunity, and other relationships. Finally, Section 7 closes this
paper.
2. Boolean functions
We consider functions from Vn to GF(2) (or simply functions on Vn), where Vn
is the vector space of n tuples of elements from GF(2). The truth table of a func-
tion f on Vn is a (0; 1)-sequence de5ned by (f(
0); f(
1); : : : ; f(
2n−1)), and the se-
quence of f is a (1;−1)-sequence de5ned by ((−1)f(
0); (−1)f(
1); : : : ; (−1)f(
2n−1)),
where 
0 = (0; : : : ; 0; 0); 
1 = (0; : : : ; 0; 1); : : : ; 
2n−1 = (1; : : : ; 1; 1). A function is said to
be balanced if its truth table contains 2n−1 zeros and an equal number of ones.
Otherwise it is called unbalanced. The matrix of f is a (1;−1)-matrix of order 2n
de5ned by M =((−1)f(
i⊕
j)) where ⊕ denotes the addition in Vn. Given two se-
quences a˜=(a1; : : : ; am) and b˜=(b1; : : : ; bm), their component-wise product is de5ned
by a˜ ∗ b˜=(a1b1; : : : ; ambm). In particular, if m=2n and, respectively, then a˜ ∗ b˜ is the
sequence of f⊕ g where ⊕ denotes the addition in GF(2). Let a˜=(a1; : : : ; am) and
b˜=(b1; : : : ; bm) be two sequences or vectors, the scalar product of a˜ and b˜, denoted
by 〈a˜; b˜〉, is de5ned as the sum of the component-wise multiplications. In particular,
when a˜ and b˜ are from Vm, 〈a˜; b˜〉= a1b1⊕ · · · ⊕ ambm, where the addition and multi-
plication are over GF(2), and when a˜ and b˜ are (1;−1)-sequences, 〈a˜; b˜〉= ∑mi=1 aibi,
where the addition and multiplication are over the reals. An a9ne function f on
Vn is a function that takes the form of f(x1; : : : ; xn)= a1x1⊕ · · · ⊕ anxn⊕ c, where
aj; c∈GF(2), j=1; 2; : : : ; n. Furthermore f is called a linear function if c=0. A
(1;−1)-matrix N of order n is called a Hadamard matrix if NNT = nIn, where NT
is the transpose of N and In is the identity matrix of order n. A Sylvester–Hadamard
matrix of order 2n, denoted by Hn, is generated by the following recursive
relation:





; n = 1; 2; : : : :
Let Li, 06i62n − 1, be the ith row of Hn. It is known that Li is the sequence
of a linear function ’i(x) on Vn, de5ned by the scalar product ’i(x)= 〈
i; x〉, where

i is the binary representation of an integer i. The Hamming weight of a (0; 1)-
sequence , denoted by HW (), is the number of ones in the sequence. Given two
functions f and g on Vn, the Hamming distance d(f; g) between them is
de5ned as the Hamming weight of the truth table of f(x)⊕ g(x), where x=
(x1; : : : ; xn).
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3. Cryptographic criteria of Boolean functions
The following criteria for cryptographic Boolean functions are often considered: (1)
balance, (2) nonlinearity, (3) avalanche, (4) correlation immunity, (5) algebraic de-
gree, (6) absence of nonzero linear structures. In this paper we focus on avalanche,
nonlinearity, avalanche and correlation immunity. Let f be a function on Vn and 
denote the sequence of f. Parseval’s equation ([9, p. 416]) is a useful tool in this
research:
∑2n−1
i=0 〈; Li〉2 = 22n where Li is the ith row of Hn, i=0; 1; : : : ; 2n − 1. The
nonlinearity of a function f on Vn, denoted by Nf, is the minimal Hamming dis-
tance between f and all aMne functions on Vn, i.e., Nf = mini=1;2; :::;2n+1 d(f;  i) where
 1;  2; : : : ;  2n+1 are all the aMne functions on Vn. High nonlinearity can be used to resist
a linear attack [10]. The following characterization of nonlinearity will be useful (for
a proof see for instance [11]).
Lemma 1. The nonlinearity of f on Vn can be expressed by Nf =2n−1− 12 max {|〈; Li〉|;
06i62n − 1} where  is the sequence of f and L0; : : : ; L2n−1 are the rows of Hn,
namely, the sequences of linear functions on Vn.
From Lemma 1 and Parseval’s equation, it is easy to verify that Nf62n−1−2(1=2)n−1
for any function f on Vn. A function f on Vn is called a bent function if 〈; Li〉2 = 2n
for every i, 06i62n−1 [15]. Hence f is a bent function on Vn if and only Nf =2n−1−
2(1=2)n−1. It is known that a bent function on Vn exists only when n is even.
We say that f satis5es the avalanche criterion with respect to 
 if f(x)⊕f(x⊕ 
)
is a balanced function, where x=(x1; : : : ; xn) and 
 is a vector in Vn. Furthermore, f is
said to satisfy the avalanche criterion of degree k if it satis5es the avalanche criterion
with respect to every nonzero vector 
 whose Hamming weight is not larger than
k. 1 From [15], a function f on Vn is bent if and only if f satis5es the avalanche
criterion of degree n.
Note that the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) [21] is the same as the avalanche cri-
terion of degree one. For a vector 
∈Vn, denote by (
) the sequence of f(x⊕ 
). Thus
(0) is the sequence of f itself and (0) ∗ (




)〉, the scalar product of (0) and (
). (
) is called the auto-
correlation of f with a shift 
. We omit the subscript of f(
) if no confusion occurs.
Obviously, (
)= 0 if and only if f(x)⊕f(x⊕ 
) is balanced, i.e., f satis5es the
avalanche criterion with respect to 
. In the case that f does not satisfy the avalanche
criterion with respect to a vector 
, it is desirable that f(x)⊕f(x⊕ 
) is almost bal-
anced. Namely, we require that |f(
)| take a small value. 
∈Vn is called a linear
structure of f if |(
)|=2n (i.e., f(x)⊕f(x⊕ 
) is a constant).
1 The avalanche criterion was called the propagation criterion in [14], as well as in all our earlier pa-
pers dealing with the subject. Historically, Feistel was apparently the 5rst person who coined the term of
“avalanche” and realized its importance in the design of a block cipher [6]. According to Coppersmith [5], a
member of the team who designed DES, avalanche properties were considered in selecting the S-boxes used
in the cipher, which contributed to the strength of the cipher against various attacks including di;erential
[1] and linear [10] attacks.
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For any function f, we have (
0)= 2n, where 
0 is the zero vector on Vn. It
is easy to verify that the set of all linear structures of a function f form a linear
subspace of Vn, whose dimension is called the linearity of f. A nonzero linear struc-
ture is cryptographically undesirable. It is also well known that if f has nonzero
linear structures, then there exists a nonsingular n× n matrix B over GF(2) such that
f(xB)= g(y)⊕  (z), where x=(y; z), y∈Vp, z ∈Vq, g is a function on Vp that has no
nonzero linear structures, and  is a linear function on Vq.
The following lemma is the re-statement of a relation proved in Section 2 of [3].
Lemma 2. For every function f on Vn, we have
((
0); (
1); : : : ; (
2n−1))Hn = (〈; L0〉2; 〈; L1〉2; : : : ; 〈; L2n−1〉2); (1)
where  denotes the sequence of f,  Li is the ith row of Hn, and 
i is the vector in Vn
that corresponds to the binary representation of i, i=0; 1; : : : ; 2n − 1.
The concept of correlation immune functions was introduced by Siegenthaler [20].
From [2,7], a correlation immune function can also be equivalently restated as follows:
Let f be a function on Vn and let  be its sequence. Then f is called a kth-order
correlation immune function if 〈; L〉=0 for every L, where L is the sequence of a
linear function ’(x)= 〈
; x〉 on Vn constrained by 16HW (
)6k. It should be noted
that 〈; L〉=0, if and only if f(x)⊕’(x) is balanced. Hence f is a kth-order correla-
tion immune function if and only if f(x)⊕’(x) is balanced for each linear function
’(x)= 〈
; x〉 on Vn where 16HW (
)6k. Correlation immune functions are used in
the design of running-key generators in stream ciphers to resist a correlation attack.
Relevant discussions on correlation immune functions, and more generally on resilient
functions, can be found in [26].
4. Relationships between nonlinearity and avalanche criterion
Let (a0; a1; : : : ; a2n−1) and (b0; b1; : : : ; b2n−1) be two real-valued sequences of length
2n, satisfying
(a0; a1; : : : ; a2n−1)Hn = (b0; b1; : : : ; b2n−1): (2)
Let p be an integer with 16p6n− 1. Rewrite (2) as
(a0; a1; : : : ; a2n−1)(Hn−p × Hp) = (b0; b1; : : : ; b2n−1); (3)
where × denotes the Kronecker product [22]. Let ej denote the jth row of Hp,
j=0; 1; : : : ; 2p−1. For any 5xed j with 06j62p−1, comparing the jth; (j+2p)th; : : : ;
(j + (2n−p − 1)2p)th terms in both sides of (3), we have
(a0; a1; : : : ; a2n−1)(Hn−p × eTj ) = (bj; bj+2p ; bj+2·2p ; : : : ; bj+(2n−p−1)2p):
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Write (a0; a1; : : : ; a2n−1)= ($0; $1; : : : ; $2n−p−1) where each $i is of length 2p. Then we
have
2n−p(〈$0; ej〉; 〈$1; ej〉; : : : ; 〈$2n−p−1; ej〉)
= (bj; bj+2p ; : : : ; bj+(2n−p−1)2p)Hn−p: (4)
Let ‘i denote the ith row of Hn−p, where i=0; 1; : : : ; 2n−p − 1. In addition, write
(bj; bj+2p ; bj+2·2p ; : : : ; bj+(2n−p−1)2p)= &j, where j=0; 1; : : : ; 2p − 1. Comparing the ith
terms in both sides of (4), we have 2n−p〈$i; ej〉= 〈&j; ‘i〉 where $i =(ai·2p ; a1+i·2p ; : : : ;
a2p−1+i·2p). These discussions lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let (a0; a1; : : : ; a2n−1) and (b0; b1; : : : ; b2n−1) be two real-valued sequences
of length 2n, satisfying
(a0; a1; : : : ; a2n−1)Hn = (b0; b1; : : : ; b2n−1):
Let p be an integer with 16p6n− 1. For any ?xed i with 06i62n−p − 1 and any
?xed j with 06j62p−1, let $i =(ai·2p ; a1+i·2p ; : : : ; a2p−1+i·2p) and &j=(bj; bj+2p ; bj+2·2p ;
: : : ; bj+(2n−p−1)2p). Then we have
2n−p〈$i; ej〉 = 〈&j; ‘i〉; i = 0; 1; : : : ; 2n−p − 1; j = 0; 1; : : : ; 2p − 1; (5)
where ‘i denotes the ith row of Hn−p and ej denotes the jth row of Hp.
Lemma 3 can be viewed as a re5ned version of the Hadamard transformation (2),
and it will be a useful mathematical tool in proving the following two lemmas. These
two lemmas will then play a signi5cant role in proving the main results of this
paper.
Lemma 4. Let f be a nonbent function on Vn, satisfying the avalanche criterion of
degree p. Denote the sequence of f by . If there exists a row L∗ of Hn such that
|〈; L∗〉|=2n−(1=2)p, then 
2t+p+2p−1 is a nonzero linear structure of f, where 
2t+p+2p−1
is the vector in Vn corresponding to the integer 2t+p + 2p − 1, t=0; 1; : : : ; n− p− 1.
Proof. Since f satis5es the avalanche criterion of degree p and HW (
j)6p, j=1; : : : ;
2p − 1, we have
(
0) = 2n; (
1) = · · · = (
2p−1) = 0: (6)
Applying 2n−p〈$0; ej〉= 〈&j; ‘0〉 to (1), we obtain 2n−p(
0)=
∑2n−p−1




〈; Lj+u·2p〉2 = 22n−p: (7)
Since L∗ is a row of Hn, it can be expressed as L∗=Lj0+u0·2p , where 06j0
62p−1 and 06u062n−p−1. Set j= j0 in (7), we have
∑2n−p−1
u=0 〈; Lj0+u·2p〉2 = 22n−p.
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From
〈; Lj0+u0·2p〉2 = 〈; L∗〉2 = 22n−p (8)
we have
〈; Lj0+u·2p〉 = 0 for all u; 06 u6 2n−p − 1; u = u0: (9)
Set i=2t and j= j0 in Lemma 3, where 06t6n− p− 1, we have
2n−p〈$2t ; ej0〉 = 〈&j0 ; ‘2t 〉; (10)
where ‘2t is the 2t th row of Hn−p and ej0 is the j0th row of Hp, j=0; 1; : : : ; 2
p−1. As f
satis5es the avalanche criterion of degree p and HW (
j)6p, j=2t+p; 1+2t+p; : : : ; 2p−
2 + 2t+p, we have
(
2t+p) = (
1+2t+p) = · · · = (
2p−2+2t+p) = 0: (11)
Applying (10) to (11), and considering (8), (9) and (11), we have 2n−p(
2p−1+2p+t )=
±22n−p and thus (
2p−1+2p+t )= ±2n. This proves that 
2p−1+2p+t is indeed a nonzero
linear structure of f, where t=0; 1; : : : ; n− p− 1.
Lemma 5. Let f be a nonbent function on Vn, satisfying the avalanche criterion of
degree p. Denote the sequence of f by . If there exists a row L∗ of Hn, such that
|〈; L∗〉|=2n−(1=2)p, then p= n− 1 and n is odd.
Proof. Since |〈; L∗〉|=2n−(1=2)p, p must be even. Due to p¿0, we must have p¿2.
We now prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume that p = n − 1. Since p¡n, we
have p6n− 2. As |〈; L∗〉|=2n−(1=2)p, from Lemma 4, 
2t+p+2p−1 is a nonzero linear
structure of f, where t=0; 1; : : : ; n−p−1. Notice that n−p−1¿1. Set t=0; 1. Thus
both 
2p+2p−1 and 
2p+1+2p−1 are nonzero linear structures of f. Since all the linear
structures of a function form a linear subspace, 
2p+2p−1⊕ 
2p+1+2p−1 is also a linear
structure of f. Hence
(
2p+2p−1 ⊕ 
2p+1+2p−1) = ±2n: (12)
On the other hand, since f satis5es the avalanche criterion of degree p and
HW (
2p+2p−1⊕ 
2p+1+2p−1)= 26p, we conclude that (
2p+2p−1⊕ 
2p+1+2p−1)= 0. This
contradicts (12). Thus we have p¿n− 2. The only possible value for p is p= n− 1.
Since p is even, n must be odd.
Theorem 6. Let f be a function on Vn, satisfying the avalanche criterion of degree p.
Then
(i) the nonlinearity Nf of f satis?es Nf¿2n−1 − 2n−1−(1=2)p,
(ii) the equality in (i) holds if and only if one of the following two conditions
holds:
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(a) p= n− 1, n is odd and f(x)= g(x1⊕ xn; : : : ; xn−1⊕ xn)⊕ h(x1; : : : ; xn), where
x=(x1; : : : ; xn), g is a bent function on Vn−1, and h is an a9ne function
on Vn.
(b) p= n, f is bent and n is even.
Proof. Due to (7), i.e.,
∑2n−p−1
u=0 〈; Lj+u·2p〉2 = 22n−p, we have 〈; Lj+u·2p〉2622n−p.
Since u and j are arbitrary, by using Lemma 1, we have Nf¿2n−1− 2n−1−(1=2)p. Now
assume that
Nf = 2n−1 − 2n−1−(1=2)p: (13)
From Lemma 1, there exists a row L∗ of Hn such that |〈; L∗〉|=2n−(1=2)p. Two cases
need to be considered: f is nonbent and f is bent. When f is nonbent, thanks to
Lemma 5, we have p= n − 1 and n is odd. Considering Proposition 1 of [4], we
conclude that f must takes the form mentioned in (a). On the other hand, if f is bent,
then p= n and n is even. Hence (b) holds.
Conversely, assume that f takes the form in (a). Applying a nonsingular linear trans-
formation on the variables, and considering Proposition 3 of [13], we have Nf =2Ng.
Since g is bent, we have Nf =2n−1 − 21=2(n−1). Hence (13) holds, where p= n − 1.
On the other hand, it is obvious that (13) holds whenever (b) does.
5. Relationships between avalanche and correlation immunity
To prove the main theorems, we introduce two more results. The following lemma
is part of Lemma 12 in [18].
Lemma 7. Let f1 be a function on Vs and f2 be a function on Vt . Then f1(x1; : : : ; xs)
⊕f2(y1; : : : ; yt) is a balanced function on Vs+t if f1 or f2 is balanced.
Next we look at the structure of a function on Vn that satis5es the avalanche criterion
of degree n− 1.
Lemma 8. Let f be a function on Vn. Then
(i) f is nonbent and satis?es the avalanche criterion of degree n − 1, if and only
if n is odd and f(x)= g(x1⊕ xn; : : : ; xn−1⊕ xn)⊕ c1x1⊕ · · · ⊕ cnxn⊕ c, where x=
(x1; : : : ; xn), g is a bent function on Vn−1, and c1; : : : ; cn and c are all constants
in GF(2),
(ii) f is balanced and satis?es the avalanche criterion of degree n− 1, if and only if
n is odd and f(x)= g(x1⊕ xn; : : : ; xn−1⊕ xn)⊕ c1x1⊕ · · · ⊕ cnxn⊕ c, where g is a
bent function on Vn−1, and c1; : : : ; cn and c are all constant in GF(2), satisfying⊕n
j=1 cj =1.
Proof. (i) holds due to Proposition 1 of [4].
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Assume that f is balanced and satis5es the avalanche criterion of degree n−1. Since
f is balanced, it is nonbent. From (i) of the lemma, f(x)= g(x1⊕ xn; : : : ; xn−1⊕xn)⊕ c1
x1⊕ · · · ⊕ cnxn⊕ c, where x=(x1; : : : ; xn), g is a bent function on Vn−1, and c1; : : : ; cn
and c are all constant in GF(2). Set uj = xj ⊕ xn, j=1; : : : ; n−1. We have f(u1; : : : ; un−1;
xn)= g(u1; : : : ; un−1)⊕ c1u1⊕ · · · ⊕ cn−1un−1⊕ (c1⊕ · · · ⊕ cn)xn⊕ c. Since g(u1; : : : ;
un−1)⊕ c1u1⊕ · · · ⊕ cn−1un−1 is a bent function on Vn−1, it is unbalanced. On the
other hand, since f is balanced, we conclude that
⊕n
j=1 cj =0, namely,
⊕n
j=1 cj =1.
This proves the necessity for (ii). Using the same reasoning as in the proof of (i), and
taking into account Lemma 7, we can prove the suMciency for (ii).
5.1. The case of balanced functions
Theorem 9. Let f be a balanced qth-order correlation immune function on Vn, satis-
fying the avalanche criterion of degree p. Then we have p+ q6n− 2.
Proof. First we note that q¿0 and p¿0. Since f is balanced, it cannot be bent. We
prove the theorem in two steps. The 5rst step deals with p+ q6n− 1, and the second
step with p+ q6n− 2.
We start with proving that p+q6n−1 by contradiction. Assume that p+q¿n. Set
i=0 and j=0 in (5), we have 2n−p〈$0; e0〉= 〈&0; ‘0〉. Since f satis5es the avalanche
criterion of degree p and HW (
j)6p, j=1; : : : ; 2p− 1, we know that (6) holds. Note
that HW (
u·2p)6n−p6q for all u, 06u62n−p − 1. Since f is a balanced qth-order
correlation immune function, we have
〈; L0〉 = 〈; L2p〉 = 〈; L2·2p〉 = · · · = 〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉 = 0:
Applying 2n−p〈$0; e0〉= 〈&0; ‘0〉 to (1), and noticing (6) and (14), we would have
2n−p(
0)= 0, i.e., 22n−p =0. This cannot be true. Hence we have proved that p +
q6n− 1.
Next we complete the proof by showing that p+q6n−2. Assume for contradiction
that the theorem is not true, i.e., p + q¿n − 1. Since we have already proved that
p+q6n−1, by assumption we should have p+q= n−1. Note that HW (
u·2p)6n−
p − 1= q for all u with 06u62n−p − 2, and f is a balanced qth-order correlation
immune function, where q= n−p− 1. Hence (14) still holds, with the exception that
the actual value of 〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉 is not clear yet. Applying 2n−p〈$0; e0〉= 〈&0; ‘0〉 to
(1), and noticing (6) and (14), we have 2n−p(
0)= 〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉2. Thus we have
〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉2 = 22n−p. Due to Lemma 5, we have p= n− 1. Since q¿1, we obtain
p+ q¿n. This contradicts the inequality p+ q6n− 1, that we have already proved.
Hence p+ q6n− 2 holds.
5.2. The case of unbalanced functions
We turn our attention to unbalanced functions. A direct proof of the following lemma
can be found in [25].
706 Y. Zheng, X.-M. Zhang / Theoretical Computer Science 292 (2003) 697–710
Lemma 10. Let k¿2 be a positive integer and 2k = a2 + b2, where both a and b are
integers with a¿b¿0. Then a=2(1=2)k and b=0 when k is even, and a= b=21=2(k−1)
otherwise.
Theorem 11. Let f be an unbalanced qth-order correlation immune function on Vn,
satisfying the avalanche criterion of degree p. Then
(i) p+ q6n,
(ii) the equality in (i) holds if and only if n is odd, p= n−1, q=1 and f(x)= g(x1⊕
xn; : : : ; xn−1⊕ xn)⊕ c1x1⊕ · · · ⊕ cnxn⊕ c, where x=(x1; : : : ; xn), g is a bent func-
tion on Vn−1, c1; : : : ; cn and c are all constants in GF(2), satisfying
⊕n
j=1 cj =0.
Proof. Since f is correlation immune, it cannot be bent. Once again we now prove (i)
by contradiction. Assume that p+q¿n. Hence n−p¡q. We keep all the notations in
Section 5.1. Note that HW (
u·2p)6n− p¡q for all u with 16u62n−p − 1. Since f
is an unbalanced qth-order correlation immune function, we have (14) again, with the
understanding that 〈; L0〉 =0. Applying 2n−p〈$0; e0〉= 〈&0; ‘0〉 to (1), and noticing (6)
and (14) with 〈; L0〉 =0, we have 2n−p(
0)= 〈; L0〉2. Hence 〈; L0〉2 = 22n−p and p
must be even. Since f is not bent, noticing Lemma 5, we can conclude that p= n− 1
and n is odd. Using (ii) of Lemma 8, we have
f(x) = g(x1 ⊕ xn; : : : ; xn−1 ⊕ xn)⊕ c1x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cnxn ⊕ c;
where x=(x1; : : : ; xn), g is a bent function on Vn−1, and c1; : : : ; cn and c are all constants
in GF(2), satisfying
⊕n
j=1 cj =0. One can verify that while xj ⊕f(x) is balanced,
j=1; : : : ; n, xj ⊕ xi ⊕f(x) is not if j = i. Hence f is 5rst-order, but not second-order,
correlation immune. Since q¿0, we have q=1 and p + q= n. This contradicts the
assumption that p+ q¿n. Hence we have proved that p+ q6n.
We now prove (ii). Assume that p+q= n. Since n−p= q, we can apply 2n−p〈$0; e0〉
= 〈&0; ‘0〉 to (1), and have (6) and (14) with 〈; L0〉 =0. By using the same reasoning
as in the proof of (i), we can arrive at the conclusion that (ii) holds.
Theorem 12. Let f be an unbalanced qth-order correlation immune function on Vn,
satisfying the avalanche criterion of degree p. If p + q= n − 1, then f also satis?es
the avalanche criterion of degree p+1, n is odd and f must take the form mentioned
in (ii) of Theorem 11.
Proof. Let p+q= n−1. Note that HW (
u·2p)6n−p−1= q for all u, 06u62n−p−
2. Since f is unbalanced and qth-order correlation immune, we have (14), although
once again 〈; L0〉 =0 and the value of 〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉 is not clear yet. Applying
2n−p〈$0; e0〉= 〈&0; ‘0〉 to (1), noticing (6) and (14), we have 2n−p(
0)= 〈; L0〉2 +
〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉2. That is
〈; L0〉2 + 〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉2 = 22n−p: (14)
There exist two cases to be considered: p is even and p is odd.
Case 1: p is even and thus p¿2. Since 〈; L0〉 =0, applying Lemma 10 to (14),
we have 〈; L0〉2 = 22n−p and 〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉=0. Due to Lemma 5, p= n− 1. Since
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q¿0, we have p + q¿n. This contradicts the assumption p + q= n − 1. Hence p
cannot be even.
Case 2: p is odd. Applying Lemma 10 to (14), we obtain 〈; L0〉2 = 〈; L(2n−p−1)·2p〉2
= 22n−p−1. Set i=2t , t=0; 1; : : : ; n−p− 1, where n−p− 1= q¿0, and j=0 in (5),
we have
2n−p〈$2t ; e0〉 = 〈&0; ‘2t 〉; (15)
where ‘2t is the 2t th row of Hn−t and e0 is the all-one sequence of length 2p.
Since f satis5es the avalanche criterion of degree p and HW (
j)6p, j=2t+p; 1 +
2t+p; : : : ; 2p − 2 + 2t+p, (11) holds. Applying (15) to (1), noticing (11) and (14),
we have 2n−p(
2t+p+2p−1)= 22n−p or 0. In other words, (
2t+p+2p−1)= 2n or 0. Let
-j ∈ Vn−p be the binary representation of integer j, j=0; 1; : : : ; 2n−p − 1. Note that ‘2t
is the sequence of a linear function  on Vn−p where  (y)= 〈-2t ; y〉. Due to (15), it
is easy to verify that (
2t+p+2p−1)= 2n (or 0) if and only if 〈-2n−p−1; -2t 〉=0 (or 1).
Note that -2n−p−1 = (0; : : : ; 0; 1; : : : ; 1) where the number of ones is equal to n−p. On
the other hand -2t can be written as -2t =(0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0). Since t6n−p− 1, we
conclude that 〈-2n−p−1; -2t 〉=1, for all t with 06t6n−p−1. Hence (
2t+p+2p−1)= 0
for all such t. Note that HW (
2t+p+2p−1)=p+1. Permuting the variables, we can prove
in a similar way that (
)= 0 holds for each 
 with HW (
)=p+1. Hence f satis5es
the avalanche criterion of degree p+1. Due to p+q= n−1, we have (p+1)+q= n.
Using Theorem 11, we conclude that n is odd and f takes the form mentioned in (ii)
of Theorem 11.
From Theorems 11 and 12, we conclude
Corollary 13. Let f be an unbalanced qth-order correlation immune function on Vn,
satisfying the avalanche criterion of degree p. Then
(i) p + q6n, and the equality holds if and only if n is odd, p= n − 1, q=1 and
f(x)= g(x1⊕ xn; : : : ; xn−1⊕ xn)⊕ c1x1⊕ · · · ⊕ cnxn⊕ c, where x=(x1; : : : ; xn), g is
a bent function on Vn−1, c1; : : : ; cn and c are all constants in GF(2), satisfying⊕n
j=1 cj =0,
(ii) p+ q6n− 2 if q =1.
6. Other relationships
In previous sections, we have established new relationships between nonlinearity
and avalanche criterion, and relationships between avalanche criterion and correlation
immunity. To complete the discussion, we now introduce relationships between non-
linearity and correlation immune functions.
Let f be an mth-order correlation immune function on Vn. If m and n satisfy the
condition of 0:6n−0:46m6n−2, [30] has proved that Nf62n−1−2m+1. This indicates
that a high order of correlation immunity yields a low nonlinearity. Zheng and Zhang
[30] further proves that Nf =2n−1 − 2m+1 if and only if the mth-order correlation
immune functions on Vn is a plateaued functions. The concept of plateaued functions
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was introduced in [27,28]. Let  denote the sequence of f and ‘j denotes the jth row
of Hn, j=0; 1; : : : ; 2n−1. If 〈; ‘j〉2 takes two zero and a nonzero value then f is called
a plateaued function. Zheng and Zhang [30] leaves open as to whether the condition
of 0:6n − 0:46m6n − 2 can be relaxed to 12n − 1¡m6n − 2 where n¿6. We have
solved this problem for odd n [31].
In general, functions do not satisfy the avalanche criterion. However, the avalanche
property of functions can be reFected by two indicators, f and .f [23]. Let f be a
function on Vn. f is de5ned as f = max
∈Vn; 
 =0 |(






Let f be mth-order correlation immune function on Vn (16m6n − 1). Zheng and




equality holds if and only if f(x)= x1⊕ · · · ⊕ xn⊕ c where x=(x1; : : : ; xn) and c is a




the equality holds if and only if f is a constant. (Note that an nth-order correlation
immune function is de5ned as a constant.) Therefore, correlation immunity is not
harmonious with avalanche characteristics.
There exist additional relationships between nonlinearity and avalanche character-
istics. For example, the authors have proved in [24] that for any function f on Vn,
the nonlinearity of f satis5es Nf62n−1 − 12
√




 =0}. Furthermore, from [27,28], we have Nf62n−1−2−n=2
−1√.f where the equality holds if and only if f is a plateaued function on Vn. These
inequalities indicate again that avalanche property is harmonious with nonlinearity.
7. Conclusions
We have established relationships between each two of three criteria: nonlinearity,
avalanche criterion and correlation immunity. More precisely, we have obtained a lower
bound on nonlinearity over all Boolean functions satisfying the avalanche criterion of
degree p. We have also characterized the functions that have the minimum nonlinearity.
We have found a mutually exclusive relationship between the degree of avalanche and
the order of correlation immunity. The new results in this work and those obtained in
[30] help further understand the two important cryptographic criteria.
There are still many interesting questions yet to be answered in this line of research.
As an example, we believe that the upper bounds in Theorems 9 and 11 can be further
improved, especially when p and q are neither too small, say close to 1, nor too
large, say close to n − 1. Another interesting problem is to examine the upper bound
on the nonlinearity of an mth-order correlation immune function on Vn, for the case
of m¡ 12n.
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